The Mere Evidence Rule: Need for Re-Evaluation by Hudak, Leona M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1971
The Mere Evidence Rule: Need for Re-Evaluation
Leona M. Hudak
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Evidence Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leona M. Hudak, The Mere Evidence Rule: Need for Re-Evaluation, 20 Clev. St. L. Rev. 361 (1971)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/14
The "Mere Evidence" Rule:
Need for Re-Evaluation
Leona M. Hudak*
T HE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics ours.) 1
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself. (Italics ours.) 2
Safeguards similar to these are provided in the constitutions or laws
of every state in the Union.
In an address delivered to the Duke University Law School, Justice
Traynor of the California Supreme Court admitted:
Of all the two-faced problems in the law, there is none more
tormenting than the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
Whichever face one turns to the wall, the question of admissibility
remains a haunting one. The evidence may be of the greatest
relevance. If its admission serves to condone lawless law enforce-
ment, however, it opens the way to government intrusion on the
privacy of law-abiding people.3
If Perry Mason, in one of his television episodes, moved the trial
court to suppress relevant certain evidence seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest and search, on grounds that it was merely evidence that
the defendant had committed the crime he was being charged with, and
if the judge sustained the motion, the reaction of the average layman,
and, indeed, of many an attorney unfamiliar with criminal law, would
understandably be that the script writers had this time unequivocally
abused their literary license. However, such a rule-that during a
search and seizure, certain items may not be taken from the accused
merely to be used against him as evidence of the alleged crime-is well
established in the law of evidence. 4
Within recent years the areas of search and seizure and self-
incrimination have undergone close scrutiny in American courts. Con-
struction of constitutional rights in favor of the accused have evoked
denunciations of "coddling criminals" to "communism" from conserv-
* B.A., Case Western Reserve University; M.A., M.A.L.S., University of Wisconsin;
Third-Year student at Cleveland State University College of Law.
1 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 Id. amend. V.
3 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Duke L. J. 319.
4 Davis, The "Mere Evidence" Rule in Search and Seizure, 35 Military L. R. 101
(1967).
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atives; and, plaudits from liberals and libertarians. In the wake of each
major decision issues a flood of periodical literature with detailed analy-
ses, both pro and con.
This article is limited to the "mere evidence rule" as enunciated in
Gouled v. United States;5 a brief historical sketch of the genesis of the
search warrant; the two landmark decisions leading to Gouled; and, an
overview of its impact upon American law, with reference to major
landmark decisions. A thorough study of the rule and its application and
interpretation in the various courts of the United States is book-length
in proportion, as the numerous case entries under Gouled in the several
editions of Shepard's United States Citations clearly illustrate. Wigmore
provides a fairly comprehensive listing of decisions on illegal searches
and seizures.0
Birth of the Search Warrant7
At early common law, the search warrant was unknown. Any un-
consented entry upon the property of another was trespass quaere
clausum fregit, punishable in (what is now called) tort, with damages
recoverable in proportion to the severity of the wrong.'
The Magna Carta was forced from King John by embattled English
barons at Runnymede on June 15, 1215. It represented a summarization
of traditional liberties enjoyed by the English people, with express ref-
erence to such liberties as had been trammeled and violated during the
Norman Conquest and thereafter. A decided blow for liberty was struck
when John finally pledged: "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned
or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or any ways destroyed; nor will we
go upon him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful judgment
of his peers, or by the law of the land."
The words "nor will we go upon him... or by the law of the land,"
are generally deemed the wellspring of the search warrant. This writ
developed as a matter of necessity, to provide a means of lawful entry
for retrieval of stolen goods. With time, its scope was gradually ex-
tended to include any property it was illegal for a free man to possess.
On the theory that such chattels as contraband and instrumentalities of
a crime were inherently evil, the Crown would seize them for the pur-
5 255 U.S. 298, 41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921).
6 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2183, 2184b, 2264 (McNaughton ed., 1961).
7 Creditable discussions of the origin of search warrants and events leading up to
the incorporation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments into the Bill of Rights of the
United States Constitution are given in Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of
the Revolution (1939); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution (1937); Andrews, Historical Survey of the
Law of Search and Seizures, 34 Law Notes 42 (1930); and Fraenkel, Concerning
Searches and Seizures, 44 Harv. L. R. 361 (1920).
8 47 Am. Jur. Searches and Seizures § 2 at 503; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 2
at 776.
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pose of "purification". Once "purified", the items would be sold, thus
supplying the government with another comfortable source of revenue.
Considerable publicity would have been given these items, in advance of
sale, since they were freely used against the possessor as evidence to
incriminate him at his trial before the entire populace.
During the era of the notorious Star Chamber-a former court of
inquisitorial and criminal jurisdiction which emerged in the 15th century
under the Tudors and was noted for its arbitrary methods and severe
punishments-the warrant became a blanket license for the king's men
to enter private premises and search for and seize anything they might
deem "evidence of crime." At this stage in its development, the search
warrant-general in scope-listed neither name of the alleged possessor
to be searched nor specific chattels to be confiscated.
Unwittingly the invention of printing from movable type by Johann
Gutenberg, c. 1450, in Mainz, Germany, was destined to play a leading
role in the developing law of search and seizure. The typographical art
was brought from the Continent to England by William Caxton, c. 1468.
Recognizing the might of the printed word, the Crown lost no time in
attempting to control the ambit of its activity. The Stationers' Company
chartered in 1557 (but allegedly formed as early as 1403), under the
aegis of the Star Chamber, limited the number of licensed printers and
type founders, as well as locales in which printing was legally sanctioned.
Nothing could be printed without an official imprimatur, following rigid
scrutiny and censorship of the matter to be printed. In an effort to
suppress alleged "seditious" publications by underground presses, cal-
culated to arouse vox populi and incite the rabble to rebellion, un-
announced searches of booksellers' shops and private homes were au-
thorized by the Star Chamber. Those apprehended with unauthorized
publications were punished by mutilation, death, whipping at the pillory,
and/or imprisonment.
The Petition of Right granted by Charles I in 1628, reaffirmed the
liberties enunciated in the Magna Carta, including every free man's
right to be safe against illegal search and seizure. Though the Star
Chamber was abolished in 1641 by Parliament, it was replaced by a new
scourge-the Licensing Act of 1662-which restricted printing in a
similar manner and provided for continuation of the flagrant and shock-
ing abuses by "messengers" of the government through the medium of
the general warrant. Private premises were broken into and entered;
unlicensed presses and their products seized; and authors and printers
apprehended and severely punished.
Though the House of Commons repealed the Licensing Act in 1695,
restraint on the press continued to be exercised, this time by means of a
stamp duty and the law of libel, the latter encompassing all manner of
writings deemed odious and "seditious" to those in political power. Dur-
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ing the reign of George III, the populace, having found itself without
representation in a corrupt House of Commons, reverted to the columns
of its newspapers for expression. Issue No. 45 of the North Briton suc-
ceeded in extirpating Lord Bute, the premier, from office. A general
warrant was put out for the discovery and apprehension of its authors
and printers, 49 of whom were subsequently arrested on suspicion. John
Wilkes (1727-1797), the author, was convicted by the King's Bench of
libel.9 Securing his release from prison on grounds of privilege as a
member of Parliament, Wilkes sued the undersecretary of state in tres-
pass and was awarded damages of £1000.10 Several days later printer
Dryden Leach, also arrested on suspicion, won a jury verdict of £ 400 in
damages against the government messengers. Lord Mansfield joined by
the other three judges pronounced the illegality of the general warrant
and declared that "no degree of antiquity could give sanction to an
usage bad in itself". 11
Keynotes to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of
the United States12
Climatically in 1765, John Entick-author of the Monitor, or British
Freeholder, another muckraking newspaper-sued Lord Halifax, the
secretary of state, and his three government messengers of trespass.
Under a general warrant, they had entered his home and seized all his
books and private papers, on grounds of suspicion of seditious libel. Lord
Camden, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Court, in a decision hailed
by historians as a "landmark of English liberty", reviewing the annals
of the general warrant, declared:
I have now taken notice of everything that has been urged upon
the present point; and upon the whole we are all of the opinion, that
the warrant to seize and carry away the party's papers in the case of
a seditious libel, is illegal and void.13
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure
their property ... Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they
are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure,
that they will hardly bear an inspection ... The law obligeth no man
to accuse himself because the necessary means of compelling self-
accusation falling on the innocent as well as the guilty would be
cruel and unjust. And it would seem that a search for evidence is
disallowed on the same principles . . . (Italics ours.)14
9 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2572, 2574, 19 How. St. Tr. 1075, 98 Engl. Repr. 327 (1765).
10 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1164, 95 Engl. Repr. 766 (1765).
11 Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1692, 1742; 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 97 Engl. Repr. 1050, 1075(1765).
12 See the works by Dickerson, Lasson, Andrews and Fraenkel, supra n. 7.
'3 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 at 1066 (1765).
14 Id. at 1029-30.
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Lord Camden's opinion is considered the font of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
Concurrently, during the 18th century, in the American Colonies, a
species of general warrant known as a "writ of assistance" was used to
raise revenue to finance the French and Indian War. John Fiske, in his
work American Revolution, described the origin of these writs:
• . . in 1767, it was decided to enforce the Navigation Act, and one
of the revenue officers at Boston applied to the superior court for a
"writ of assistance", or general search warrant, to enable him to
enter private houses and search for smuggled goods, but without
specifying either house or goods . . . But James Otis showed the
court that the issue of . . . such universal writs . . . was, "a kind of
power, the exercise of which cost one king of England his head and
another his throne"; . . . and "placed the liberty of every man in
the hands of every petty officer." . . . Chief Justice Hutchinson
granted the writs . . . , but Otis' . . . eloquence made so great an
impression upon the people that this scene in the court room has
been since remembered . . . as the opening scene of the American
Revolution. 15
Such was the milieu from which the Constitution of the United
States and the Bill of Rights emerged.
Prelude to Gouled: Boyd v. U. S. and Weeks v. U. S.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and
seizures. Unfortunately no clear-cut formula or rule exists for determin-
ing whether or not a search is reasonable. Each case must be decided
upon its own circumstances and merits. The mills of the courts like
those of the gods grind exceedingly slow. The interpretation of un-
reasonable in regard to searches and seizures did not reach the United
States Supreme Court until 1886--121 years after Entick.
16
In Boyd v. United States,'7 the federal government sought to compel
Boyd and his company to forfeit 35 cases of plate glass he had allegedly
smuggled into the country without paying the customs duty. At issue
was the validity of a subpoena directing him to produce in court an in-
voice for these goods, pursuant to customs and revenue laws, which
compelled examination of books and records pertaining to the alleged
offense by a judicial officer. Non-compliance with the subpoena was
tantamount to confession. Defendant complied. Though no actual search
and seizure had taken place, the Supreme Court reviewing Entick, in an
unanimous opinion written by Justice Bradley, equated a compulsory
production of an individual's private papers with an unreasonable search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment:
15 As quoted by Andrews, supra n. 7 at 45.
16 Supra n. 13.
17 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 695, 29 L. Ed. 763 (1886).
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... any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of
crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of that
[Entick] judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other...I
And any compulsory discovery by ... compelling the production of
his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit
his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government .... 19
And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself .... 20
Though it used a search and seizure approach, the Court in Boyd
clearly recognized an individual's constitutional right to protection
against self-incrimination. It is from this holding that the rule against
seizure of merely evidentiary materials has evolved, i.e. when property
seized is of such a nature that introduction of it into evidence is a denial
of its owner's right against self-incrimination, the seizure is unreasonable
and the material must be excluded.
Weeks v. United States21 reaffirmed the holding of Boyd. The de-
fendant had been convicted of using the mails to transport lottery cou-
pons. Introduced into evidence were items seized by the state officers
in one search and by state officers and the federal marshal in another
search of Weeks' premises, without warrant, during his absence. Justice
Day give the opinion of the Supreme Court:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protec-
tion of the 4th Amendment . . . , is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution ... 22
We therefore reach the conclusion that the letters in question
were taken from the house of the accused . . . in direct violation of
the constitutional rights of the defendant; . . . In holding them and
permitting their use at trial, we think prejudicial error was com-
mitted .... 23
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States24 which enunciated the
fruit of the poisoned tree doctrine also resulted in the exclusion of il-
legally seized private documents and books. Although the mere evi-
dence rule per se had not yet been expressly articulated, material which
was clearly only evidentiary was being isolated and identified.
18 Id. at 630.
19 Id. at 632.
20 Id. at 633; Davis, supra n. 4 at 103.
21 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1913).
22 Id. at 393.
23 Id. at 398.
24 251 U.S. 385, 40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319 (1914).
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Gouled vs. U. S.
In Gouled v. United States25 our supreme tribunal met head-on the
issue of personal property being seized for its merely evidentiary value.
Gouled, along with an army officer named Vaughan, and Gouled's attor-
ney Podell were suspected in January, 1918, of conspiring to defraud the
United States government, through contracts for clothing and equip-
ment, and of using the mails to promote their scheme. Cohen, who was
an army private attached to the intelligence division and a business
acquaintance of Gouled's, acting under orders of his superior officers,
feigned a friendly call upon Gouled. Gaining admission to the latter's
office in his absence, without any warrant, Cohen seized and carried
away a number of documents. One of these being of "evidential value
only", was subsequently delivered to a United States attorney who
introduced it into evidence over Gouled's objection. Gouled did not
know that Cohen had carried away any of his papers until the latter
appeared on the witness stand.26 Charles Evans Hughes argued in be-
half of Gouled on appeal. Six questions were certified by the Court of
Appeals27 to the Supreme Court. The first two pertained to the above
stated facts:
[1] Is the secret taking or abstraction, without force, by a repre-
sentative of any branch or subdivision of the Government of the
United States, of a paper writing of evidential value only belonging
to one suspected of crime and from the house or office of such per-
son,-a violation of the 4th Amendment? (Italics ours.) 2 8
In reply, Justice Clarke stated:
. . . whether entrance to the home or office of a person suspected of
crime be obtained by a representative of any branch or subdivision
of the Government of the United States by stealth, or through social
acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call, and whether the
owner be present or not when he enters, any search and seizure
subsequently made in his absence, falls within the scope of the pro-
hibition of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the answer to the
first question must be in the affirmative.
[2] Is the admission of such paper in evidence against the same per-
son when indicted for crime a violation of the 5th Amendment?
To which Justice Clarke answered:
Upon authority of the Boyd Case, supra, this second question
must also be answered in the affirmative. In practice the result is
the same to the one accused of crime, whether he be obliged to
supply evidence against himself or whether such evidence be ob-
tained by an illegal search of his premises and seizure of his private
25 Supra n. 5.
26 Id. at 304-5.
27 264 F. 839 (2d Cir. 1920).
28 Supra n. 25 at 305.
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papers. In either case he is the unwilling source of the evidence, and
the Fifth Amendment forbids that he shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself in a criminal case. 29
As noted in the opinion, the other four questions concerned three
documents which had been admitted into evidence at the trial over the
same constitutional objections as were interposed to the admission of the
first paper. One was an unexecuted contract between Gouled and one
Lavinsky; another was a written contract signed by Gouled and one
Steinthal; the third was a bill for Podell's legal services to Gouled. The
first of these was seized in Gouled's office under a search warrant dated
June 17, 1918; the others, under a warrant dated July 22, 1918. Both
warrants had been issued by a United States Commissioner on the affi-
davit of an agent of the Department of Justice, under authorization of
the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917. After the seizure of the papers a
joint indictment was returned against Gouled, Vaughan, and Podell.30
These four questions, likewise answered in the affirmative, were:
[3] ... Are papers of no pecuniary value but possessing evidential
value against persons presently suspected and subsequently indicted
... when taken under search warrants . .. from the house or office
of the person so suspected-seized and taken in violation of the 4th
Amendment?31
[4] ... If such papers so taken are admitted in evidence against the
person from whose house or office they were taken, such person be-
ing then on trial for the crime of which he was accused in the affi-
davit for warrant-is such admission in evidence a violation of the
5th Amendment?
[5] . . . If . . . the party whose premises are to be searched be
charged with one crime and property be taken under the warrant
issued thereon,-can such property so seized be introduced in evi-
dence against said party when on trial for a different offense?32
[6] . . . If papers of evidential value only be seized under a search
warrant and the party from whose house or office they are taken be
indicted;-if he then move before trial for the return of said papers
and said motion is denied-is the court at trial bound in law to
inquire as to the origin of or method of procuring said papers when
they are offered in evidence against the party so indicted?3 3
The rule of Gouled was formulated in the ensuing quoted paragraph
which defined the categories of property that might be seized in execu-
tion of a search warrant:
... it is clear that, . . . as a result of the Boyd and Weeks Cases,
... they [search warrants] may not be used as a means of gaining
29 Id. at 306.
30 Id. at 306-7.
81 Id. at 309-10.
32 Id. at 311.
83 Id. at 312.
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access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose
of making a search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but that they may be resorted to only
when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in
the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the possesion of it, or when
a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the prop-
erty by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.
(Italics ours.) 34
Legal writers generally agree that Gouled was based on theories of
property interests vested in the accused, because of its reference to
primary right, even though the Fourth Amendment infers a right of free-
dom from government intrusion, or a right of privacy, which is personal
in nature.
Gouled provided the basis for Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure,5 which states that valid search warrants may be
issued to search for and seize the following types of property: (1) instru-
mentalities of crime (2) fruits of crime (3) weapons used in the com-
mission of crime, and (4) contraband. In the words of one legal writer:
The . . . Rules . . . provide for these objects alone. In a sense, each
of the permissible objectives of a search is a category of chattels in
which either the possessor has no property right or his right has
been forfeited. The thief has no property right in stolen goods; the
possessor has no property right in contraband; and perhaps the in-
strumentalities of the crime and the weapons used in its commission
are deodands, 3 which, as in the case of contraband are subject to
immediate forfeitureY
The rule of Gouled basically is that objects of evidentiary value
only may not be seized by federal officers in the execution of a search
warrant; and that when such objects are seized, they must be sup-
pressed. The rule also applies to the suppression of similar items seized
incidental to an arrest. The United States Supreme Court has never
revised this original formulation. While the statement of the rule is
clear, problems arose in its subsequent application. Gouled represented
the "zenith" of the mere evidence rule. Cases which followed became
enmeshed in exceptions to it, as a result of the rule's inherent "residual"
nature, as noted in the preceding paragraph, i.e., anything which is
34 Id. at 309.
35 18 U.S.C. 3771, 3772.
36 (Lat. Deo dandum, a thing to be given to God) In English law any personal chat-
tel which was the immediate occasion of the death of any reasonable creature, and
which was forfeited to the crown to be applied to pious uses and distributed in alms
by the high almoner. Black's Law Dictionary 523 (4th ed., 1951).
37 Shellow, The Continuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and Seizure
of Evidence, 48 Marquette L. R. 172, 173 (1964).
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neither contraband, nor instrumentality, nor fruit, nor weapon of a
crime.38
Impact of Gouled on American Law
A. Exceptions to the Mere Evidence Rule
1. Instrumentalities of a Crime8 9
The reason most often cited by courts for seizing and admitting
merely evidentiary material is that it is also the instrumentality of a
crime. There is, as admitted in United States v. Brengle,40 difficulty in
drawing the fine line of distinction as to whether personal papers and
other articles belong to the former or latter category.
The period of Prohibition in American history provided the courts
with many opportunities to test the issue of mere evidence v. instru-
mentality. Bootleg liquor dealers kept detailed records of their enter-
prises which, if admitted into evidence, often proved incriminating.
41
United States v. Kirschenblatt42 was a significant example promulgating
the Gouled rule. The defendant was arrested for alleged "moonshining".
His premises were searched, and his papers and books were seized.
Judge Learned Hand ruled that the "sum of a man's documentary prop-
erty" was as inviolate upon his arrest "as upon a search warrant", and
that because a document may once have been concerned with a criminal
operation, it was not "a seizable item per se".43 In Marron v. United
States,44 the defendant tried to suppress ledgers and utility bills relating
to an illegal liquor operation, which were seized under a search warrant,
incidental to an arrest. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding
that these items were actually used to commit the offense in the presence
of federal officers and thus were instrumentalities subject to seizure.45
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States46 involved seizure of a liquor
wholesaler's papers and records at the time of an invalid arrest. The
Supreme Court sustained a motion to suppress, distinguishing the case
from Marron, on grounds that the search had been a general exploratory
one, unreasonable ab initio. The Go-Bart rationale was applied in United
38 Comment, The Mere Evidence Rule: Limitations on Seizure under the 4th Amend-
ment, 54 Calif. L. R. 2099, 2106 (1966).
39 Categories 1 through 5 of this section are those used by Davis supra n. 4 at 109-
117.
40 29 F. Supp. 190, 191 (W.D. Va. 1939) as cited by Davis, supra n. 4 at 109-110.
41 Id. at 110.
42 16 F. 2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
43 Id. at 204; see also Davis, supra n. 4, at 110.
44 275 U.S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927).
45 Id. at 198-9; see also Davis, supra n. 4, at 107, 108, 111.
46 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931); see also Davis, supra n. 4 at 107,
111.
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States v. Lefkowitz. 47 Lefkowitz and his co-defendant were also charged
with a conspiracy to violate the Volstead Act, by operating a wholesale
liquor business. Federal agents, acting pursuant to an arrest warrant,
apprehended Lefkowitz in his office, which they then proceeded to
search, seizing a large quantity of books, papers, and other items-
among them business records, unmailed correspondence, completed order
slips, and light bills.48 The Court labeled these mere evidence which
"could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search
warrant issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such
things and disclosing exactly where they were." 49
Zap v. United States" involved the seizure of a cancelled check dur-
ing a governmental audit of defendant's books. The Supreme Court held
the check to be an instrumentality in scheming to defraud the govern-
ment, and its seizure lawful. Abel v. United States5' declared the seizure
of a bank book in an assumed name, false birth certificates and other
personality, valid, as an incident to an Immigration Department admin-
istrative arrest, since these were "instrumentalities for the commission
of espionage, admissible as an exception to the mere evidence rule." 52
Thus, as previously noted, while the courts used the instrumentality
exception most frequently for approving seizures of merely evidentiary
material, whether or not an item is applicable to the category, continues
to be governed by the merits of each individual case.53
The United States Supreme Court has never applied the rule in a
case which did not involve personal papers.The same can generally be said of lower federal decisions, except
for the period between 1958 and 1966, when the trend reversed itself. In
Morrison v. United States54 police arrested the defendant in his home for
committing a perverted act on a ten-year old boy who directed them to
a bedroom where they found a handkerchief allegedly bearing tangible
evidence of the offense. The court suppressed the handkerchief as mere
evidentiary material "not the instrument or means by which the crime
was committed." 55 In Williams v. United States,56 the observances of a
47 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932); see also Davis, supra n. 4 at 107-
109.
48 United States v. Lefkowitz, supra n. 47, at 458-60.
49 Id. at 464-5.
50 328 U.S. 624, 66 S. Ct. 1277, 90 L. Ed. 1477 (1946); see also Davis, supra n. 4 at 108.
51 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683, 4 L. Ed. 2d (1960).
52 See Davis, supra n. 4, at 109.
53 Id. at 113; see n. 43 therein for a list of cases holding both pro and con.
54 262 F. 2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
55 Id. at 450. But see State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259, 373 P. 2d 392, 401 (1962), in which
a camera, empty beer bottles, and a bedsheet seized pursuant to an arrest for statu-
tory rape, but without a search warrant, were held to be "property used as the means
of committing a felony."
56 263 F. 2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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searching officer were ruled inadmissible on the rationale that visual evi-
dence is excluded under Gouled. In United States v. Linsy57-another
Volstead Act Violation-the United States District Court cited Gouled
in suppressing keys which allegedly implicated the defendant with a
convicted co-defendant. This lower court federal trend reversed itself
radically in Golliher v. United States,5s which illustrates the present
devitalized status of the Gouled rule. Go~liher established the "relevant-
evidence" rule. Police seized the defendant's clothing after arresting him
for bank robbery. The court labeled the mere evidence rule a refuge for
courts to hide behind instead of facing squarely the difficult problem of
search and seizure evidence. 5 The decisive issue was the seizure, the
court reasoned, since the accused was already subject to a search; and
the question was not whether or not he could be searched, but what
could be taken.60 Presumably, under Golliher, any evidence, except
private-personal documents, relevant to a crime are subjects of reason-
able seizure and thus legally admissible."'
2. Fruits of a Crime
While stolen goods can quite comprehensibly fall into this excepted
category, it has on occasion been applied rather subtly. In Matthews v.
Correa,6 2 pursuant to defendant's arrest for concealing certain assets
from his trustee in bankruptcy, officers seized some address books and a
business ledger. The court rejected a claim of mere evidence of crime
and held that these were "fruits of [a] related crime of withholding from
the trustee documents pertaining to the bankrupt's property and
affairs." 63
3. Contraband
Placed in this category, in addition to the commonplace items, are
narcotics, counterfeit money, gambling paraphernalia, and numbers'
slips., 4 In United States v. McDaniel,65 a towel involved in an unex-
plained manner in a murder was held reasonably seized as "contraband."
Presumably Judge Holzhoff confused contraband and instrumentality.60
-7 Criminal No. 63-CR-135 (E.D. Wis. 1964).
58 362 F. 2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966).
59 Id. at 600.
60 Id. at 601.
61 Id. at 601-2.
62 135 F. 2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943).
63 Id. at 535; see also Davis, supra n. 4 at 114.
64 Id.
65 154 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1957), aff'd. 255 F. 2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1957), -cert. denied, 358
U.S. 853 (1958).
66 Id. at 2; see also Davis, supra, n. 4 at 114-5.
May 1971
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/14
MERE EVIDENCE RULE
4. Business Records
Books and records required by law to be kept represent another
well-known exception to the mere evidence rule. These are held prop-
erly seizable on grounds that they are "quasi-public" and not within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 67
5. Items Seized from the Person
It is a generally accepted conclusion that any items seized from the
person upon his arrest and appearing relevant to the alleged crime are
admissible, although neither Gouled nor Boyd provides a basis for such
a broad exception to the mere evidence rule. Usually such evidence is
admitted under a label of instrumentality, contraband, or fruit of a
crime. One writer has noted that the United States Supreme Court has
never made an attempt to distinguish the difference between authority
to search an accused incident to an arrest, which is reasonable, and au-
thority to seize items of purely evidentiary value found during the
search, which is not.68
B. The States and the Mere Evidence Rule
The application of Gouled by state courts has been ably summarized:
State courts have in general paid little attention to the Gouled
rule. Those which have acknowledged it have not created meaning-
ful guidelines as to what distinguishes an instrumentality from mere
evidence. 69
This lack of guidelines is found even in those states which fol-
lowed the Gouled rules before Mapp.70 The leading pre-Mapp cases
in these states often discuss various bases for the rule and adopt it
for a variety of reasons, but few of them concern themselves with
the nature of the distinction.71
Florida appears to be the only state which dealt directly with
the Gouled rule before Mapp . . .72
Most of the other state courts have either ignored the rule or
seem to have mentioned it by accident . . .73
67 Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 1375, 92 L. Ed. 908 (1966); People v.
Thayer, 47 Calif. Rep. 780, 408 P. 2d 108 (1965), see also Davis, supra n. 4 at 115.
Cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 (1966).
68 Id. at 115-6.
69 Note, Evidentiary Searches-The Rule and the Reason, 54 Geo. L. J. 593, 6161-621
(1966).
70 Id. at 616, n. 149 therein, i.e. Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming.
71 Id. at 616-7.
72 Id. at 617.
73 Id. at 617-8.
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The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether or
not the mere evidence rule applies to the states. Mapp v. Ohio74 held
that all evidence obtained by seizures in violation of constitutional stand-
ards is inadmissible in a state court. Ker v. California7 5 made the stand-
ard of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment nationally uniform,
but this reasonableness is a substantial determination to be made by the
trial court "from the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light
of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Amendment and in the
opinions of this court in applying the Amendment." 76 Malloy v. Hogan77
applied the Fifth Amendment to the states. These three cases put the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments on an equal basis in regard
to the reasonableness of searches and seizures.
Although there has been much discussion of the exclusionary
rule since Mapp, there does not seem to have been much discussion
of the Gouled rule.
Nevada ... Michigan . . . Kansas, Georgia, Vermont, Nebraska,
Maryland, and New York... have refused to follow the Gouled rule
after Mapp.78
California has rejected the mere evidence rule by statute.7 9
There have been, however, several post-Mapp state cases which
have adopted and applied the rule [in] . . . Virginia, Pennsylvania
... Colorado ... Oregon ... and ... New Jersey.
80
Whether or not the states apply the mere evidence rule depends on
whether they interpret it as having a constitutional basis or a rule-
making basis. If the former, they must apply the rule because of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the latter, then the rule does not apply to
state courts.8 '
Two fairly recent decisions, widely commented upon, show that the
states seem to favor the second alternative. State v. Bisaccia 2 rejected
the Gouled rule in part,8 3 specifically, the primary-right theory enunci-
ated therein. Pursuant to a valid search warrant, a pair of shoes "with
a half moon heel" was seized. Probable cause for the warrant was sev-
eral plaster casts of footprints in muddy soil at the scene of an armed
robbery. The opinion distinguished between an individual's private
74 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
75 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963).
76 Id. at 31-5.
77 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1964).
78 Supra, n. 69 at 618.
79 Calif. Penal Code § 1524, subd. 4, p. 110.
80 Supra, n. 69 at 619-21.
81 Davis, supra n. 4 at 119.
82 45 N.J. 504, 213 A. 2d 185 (1965).
83 It had been applied the year before in State v. Naturile, 83 N.J. Super. 563, 200 A.
2d 617 (1964).
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papers to which it limited the mere evidence rule, and other personal
property; and it permitted "tangible articles" to "be seized for their in-
culpatory value alone", if the search comports with the procedural re-
quirements of that amendment.8 4 In its rationale the court attempted to
strike a balance between the individual's right to privacy and the fair
administration of criminal justice. In People v. Thayer,8 5 the defendant
physician and his office assistant were convicted of submitting false and
fraudulent medical care claims to the California Bureau of Public Assist-
ance. Under a valid search warrant the doctor's medical records were
seized. Clearly they fell within the "instrumentality" and "business
records" exceptions to the Gouled rule. Chief Justice Traynor, in writ-
ing the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, declared the real
issues to be the conflicting interests of individual privacy and law en-
forcement. As in Bisaccia, the latter controlled. The search and seizure
of Thayer's records was deemed reasonable, because it was conducted
pursuant to a valid search warrant specifically describing the items to
be seized and because there was probable cause to justify its issuance.
These requirements having been met, Justice Traynor found "it impos-
sible to understand why the admissibility of seized items should depend
upon whether they are merely evidentiary or evidentiary plus something
else." 86 Traynor discussed the United States Supreme Court's tendency
not to treat the Gouled rule as a fundamental constitutional standard
and the severe limitations imposed upon it, particularly by the instru-
mentality exception. 7 California left no doubt that it deems the mere
evidence rule unsanctionable in its present form.8 8
C. Ohio and the Mere Evidence Rule
Up to the Mapp decision, no evidence was to be excluded in Ohio
because the search or seizure was illegal. The court did not have to
consider the collateral issue of how the evidence was obtained. Thus
evidence that was "legally" obtained could not be excluded because it
was merely evidentiary.89
The situation in Ohio since Mapp was summarized in a law review
comment which points out that until Mapp v. Ohio there were compar-
atively few Ohio cases involving search and seizure; that in many cases
decided since then, the Ohio courts have been, for the most part, success-
ful in applying the federal standards of probable cause and reasonable-
ness; that because search and seizure warrants are governed in Ohio
84 Supra, n. 86 at 519.
85 47 Calif. Rep. 780, 408 P. 2d 108 (1965), cert. den. 384 U.S. 908 (1966).
86 Id. at 109.
87 Id. at 109-113.
88 Supra, n. 79.
89 15 Ohio Jur. 2d, Criminal Law § 368.
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by statute, the arrest procedure does not require a judge or magistrate
to decide probable cause, as is demanded by the Fourth Amendment.
Hence, the Ohio procedure should be revised to conform to the constitu-
tional standards.9 0
The comment concluded that Ohio Lawyers should be careful to
raise all issues concerning illegal searches by a pre-trial motion to sup-
press the evidence. The rules regarding standing to object and burden
of proof to establish probable cause are not well defined in Ohio. The
federal cases have been given considerable weight. In areas where
there are no cases in Ohio, it is likely that the courts will look in the
future to the federal law.91
D. Devitalization of Gouled
Upholding the construction that the Gouled rule should be strictly
limited to personal and private documents was Schmerber v. California.9
Here the defendant was compelled to submit to a blood test to determine
whether or not he had been driving while intoxicated. He alleged the
blood test to be an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of his
right to privacy. In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the United
States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment protection of
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusions by the state
did not imply that the human body is in all circumstances inviolate
against such forays.9 3 By analogy, if an intrusion into the body does not
violate the right to privacy, there is no justification for condemning a
valid seizure of any relevant non-documentary evidence to establish the
commission of a particular crime. The Supreme Court held further that
the blood test did not violate the Fifth Amendment which, it empha-
sized, protects an accused from being compelled to provide the state with
evidence of a "testimonial" or "communicative" nature; and the extrac-
tion of blood did not constitute such an enforcement upon the accused;
on the contrary, his testimonial capacities were nowise implicated, and
his participation was irrelevant to the results of the test.94 Thus,
Schmerber allows the admission into evidence of any "real" or "physi-
cal" evidence, even if it be taken by force.
Consistent with this holding was Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden,9 5 which devitalized the rule further by also limiting non-seiz-
able items to those which are testimonial or communicative in nature
90 Comment, Search and Seizure in Ohio, 27 Ohio St. L. J. 523 (1966).
91 Id. at 523-4.
92 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966).
93 Id. at 770.
94 Id. at 765.
95 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967).
May 1971
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/14
MERE EVIDENCE RULE
and thus clearly self-incriminating. Two cab drivers followed a man
fleeing the scene of a robbery. Police alerted by them, were admitted
into the suspect's home by Mrs. Hayden, who did not object to their
search without a warrant. Hayden was in a bedroom pretending to be
asleep. A cap was found under his mattress, and a jacket and trousers
matching the cab driver's description, in a washing machine. Hayden
exhausted his state proceedings and then sought habeas corpus relief in
federal courts. A divided Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals finally held
that the clothing had been improperly admitted into evidence. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Justice Brennan also
delivered this opinion, with reference to his earlier opinion in Schmer-
ber:
The items of clothing involved in this case are not "testimonial"
or "communicative" in nature, and their introduction did not compel
respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 . . . This
case does not require that we consider whether these are items of
evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the
object of a reasonable search and seizure. (Italics ours.) 96
In view of the care with which Justice Brennan characterized the
Hayden evidence as not being "testimonial" or "communicative" in na-
ture, the implication appeared to be that such evidence is excludable
under the Fifth Amendment and thus not lawfully seizable under the
Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the Court so held a short time later, by
implication, if not expressly, in Berger v. State of New York, 97 which
invalidated New York's wiretapping-eavesdrop statute; and, in Katz
v. United States,98 which declared the F.B.I.'s activities in electronically
intercepting, without a warrant, the defendant's telephone transmittals
of wagering information, from a public phone booth, to be an "unreason-
able search and seizure".
Conclusion
What is lacking in the area of search and seizure is a comprehensible
and comprehensive re-evaluation, interpretation, and construction of the
fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the Fourth Amendment. As
this paper has attempted to show, the courts of the various jurisdictions
of the United States have followed no consistent pattern in this area in
arriving at their decisions and in formulating their rules. Small wonder
that "the ordinary prudent man" is distrustful of our judicial process.
As the courts continue to engage in games of legal fiction, the system
96 Id. at 302-3.
9T 388 U.S. 41, 87 S. Ct. 1873, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1040 (1967).
98 389 U.S. 347, 889 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
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loses effectiveness. Reason somehow must conform with law, in arriv-
ing at workable, just rules, resulting in a minimum of conflict. 99
Legal scholars and writers themselves disagree as to whether or not
the mere evidence rule is dead. Though the original rationale may have
been grounded in a concept of property rights, within the basic context
of the Fourth Amendment, an analysis of cases in which it has been
brought into issue shows that in implementation its basic purpose is the
protection of personal rights, as evidenced by the frequency with which
courts rely upon the Fifth Amendment in applying the mere evidence
rule. Since the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination
played a dominant role in the formulation of the rule, as a foregone
conclusion, any re-evaluation and re-formulation of the rule would be
bottomed upon it. To preclude further decades of mass confusion in our
courts in interpreting and construing such a rule of search and seizure
will necessitate an unequivocal holding by the United States Supreme
Court that the new rule is constitutionally based and hereafter applica-
ble as a rule of procedure in all federal and state fora without exception.
99 Davis, supra n. 4 at 125.
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